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Abstract
The creation of the Court of First Instance has contributed on the one hand to the improvement
of the functioning of the Court of Justice, and on the other hand, better judicial protection of
Union citizens. The latter was accomplished through the legal protection within the framework of
creating a true European citizenship.

ESSAYS
THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Paolo Mengozzi*
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY INTEGRATION
THAT HAS HELPED CREATE THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE AD ITS INTEGRATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE CREATION OF AN UNION CITIZENSHIP
The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community,' improving the Treaty establishing the European Coal and
Steel Community,2 has emphasized the improvement of the conditions of the people and of the citizens of the European Community (or "Community"). In this regard, it bestowed upon the
Court of the Justice of the European Communities (or "Court of
Justice"):
a) the jurisdiction to hear all actions that individuals can
bring involving matters that concern them both individually and directly;
b) the jurisdiction to adjudicate preliminary rulings in matters of Community Law, concerning individuals, referred to the Court of Justice by Member State judges.
It is important to note that the tradition of the original Member
States preserving their own sovereignty, both judicially and politically, has been taken into account when establishing these jurisdictions of the Court of Justice.
* Judge, Court of First Instance of the European Communities; Professor of Law,
University of Bologna. Translated by Daniel K. Winterfeldt, associate at Hughes, Hubbard & Reed since 1998, working in the New York, Miami offices in the Corporate
Department. Mr. Winterfeldt has participated in the Dean Acheson Legal Stage Program at the Court of First Instance of the European Communities organized by the U.S.
Embassy in Luxembourg and worked in the Chambers of Judge Mengozzi in Spring
1999.
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
2. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty].
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On the one hand, giving the right to challenge the legality
of acts adopted by Community Institutions (but not to such acts
made by Member States that appear incompatible with Community Law) has been, without a shadow of a doubt, looked upon
favorably by the founding Member States, as a measure to ensure
the most effective limitations possible of the powers bestowed
upon the Commission of the European Communities ("Commission").
On the other hand, the right of Member State judges to
refer directly to the Court of Justice for preliminary rulings regarding issues of Community Law somewhat has set aside the
need for a right of individuals to appeal directly to the Court of
Justice, challenging national judiciary acts that appear incompatible with Community Law.
The work of the Court of Justice has not in itself been sufficient to free the process of European integration, and, consequently, the deferral to the Court of Justice by national judges of
Community Law issues, from this tradition of preserving Member State sovereignty. The Court of Justice itself has considered
the contributions of Member State judges to be fundamental.
The Court of Justice strongly has stated that a true realization of
European integration presupposes that national judges apply the
norms and the acts through which the Community itself pursues
its goals, even when faced with following incompatible norms
and acts of the Member States. It took until the middle of the
1980s for these judges finally to accept this essential idea of the
Court of Justice. Two phenomena, which are particularly interrelated, have occurred uniquely at that same moment.
A. The First Phenomena
When Member State judges, after sober reflection, began
accepting the theory of the Court of Justice, they began feeling
the need frequently to bring more questions of Community Law
to the Court of Justice for preliminary interpretation. In 1970,
of all possible cases in its various jurisdictions, the court heard
seventy-nine such cases. By the end of the 1980s, this annual
number had surpassed 400.
B. The Second Phenomena
The fact that Member State judges have recognized that in-
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dividuals can invoke the norms of Community Law, even against
following Member State laws, which were incompatible with
them, has allowed the Member States to assimilate the idea, advanced by the Court of Justice in the 1960s. This idea is that
Community Law constitutes a legal system of a new kind that
recognizes as its subject, not only the Member States, but also
their citizens, and which, consequently, must be structured in
such a way as to service the latter.
The Court of First Instance of the European Communities
("Court of First Instance") was created simultaneously with these
two phenomenon. It has been created as an instrument that not
only adequately would address the growing caseload of the
Court of Justice, but also would respond to the demand, not in
any way less important, to improve the legal protection within
the framework of creating a true European citizenship that was
not launched by accident at that time.'
C. The Structure and the Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
The Court of First Instance initially has been foreseen by
the Single European Act 4 (entered into effect on July 1, 1987),
which, by adding to the Treaty establishing the European Community5 ("EC Treaty") Article 225 (previously Article 168),6 has
given the Council of Europe ("Council") the power to create the
3. For an extensive bibliography regarding the Court of First Instance, see PAOLO
MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 60 (2nd Ed., Kluwer International, 1999). See M.
MIGLIAZZA, IL DoPPio GRADO DI GIURISDIZIONE NEL DIR1TO DELLE COMUNITA EUROPEE

(Milano, 1993); P. BIAVATI & F. CARIi, DIRirro PROCESSUALE COMMUNITARIO (Milano
1994).
4. Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amedining EEC Treaty, supra note 1).
5. Treaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719
[hereinafter TEU]. The Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, as amended by SEA, supra note 4. The Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") was amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending
the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities
and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. C 340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam]. These amendments were incorporated into the EC Treaty, and the articles of
the EC Treaty were renumbered in the Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing
the European Community, OJ. C 340/3 (1997), 37 I.L.M. 79 [hereinafter Consolidated
EC Treaty], incorporatingchanges made by Treaty of Amsterdam, supra.
6. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art. 225, O.J. C 340/3, at 270 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 124-25 (ex Article 168a).
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Court of First Instance. The Council has used this power to
adopt its Decision of October 24, 1998. The creation of the
Court of First Instance was later "constitutionalized" by the
Treaty on European Union that, by modifying the text of Article
168A, solidly inserted this body in the European Communities
judicial system and definitively integrated it into the structure of
the Court of Justice.
Currently the Court of First Instance is composed of fifteen
judges, selected for their political independence and possessing
the required abilities to exercise their judicial function. They
are nominated, just as the members of the Court of Justice,
unanimously by the Member States for a six-year term. The
members may have their term renewed after the expiration of
their initial term.
The Court of First Instance is made up of chambers composed of three or five members. The Court of First Instance established the criteria according to which the matters before it
are divided among the chambers. In cases where the matter is
particularly important or has complex fact patterns, the chamber that is in charge of such case may either, of its own accord or
at the request of a party, have the matter transferred to a larger
chamber or to a plenary session of the entire Court of First Instance. When the latter occurs, the plenary composition of the
Court of First Instance decides whether to hear the case after
consulting with the parties and the Advocate General.
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance has been considerably expanded since its creation. The new test of Article
225 (formerly Article 168A) reserves to the Court of Justice only
the jurisdiction to deliver preliminary rulings or report by Member States judges. Through successive decisions in 1988, 1993,
and 1994, the Council has conferred upon the Court of First
Instance jurisdiction in matters concerning Community Institutions and individuals. It also has given the Court of First Instance jurisdiction over disputes between the Community and its
officials, and jurisdiction in recourses for annulment, failure to
act, and extracontractual liability formed by natural and legal
persons against Community Institutions. In addition, it attributed to the Court of First Instance the jurisdiction to hear controversies regarding rights bestowed by contracts made with individuals by the European Community or its agents. With respect
to jurisdiction over fines, staff regulations, and contractual obli-
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gations, the Court of First Instance has full jurisdiction. Article
65, Paragraph 3 of Regulation 40/94' gives absolute jurisdiction
over matters over which the Court of First Instance is asked to
rule upon with respect to Community matters. The later expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, with the
reservation that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction
over certain matters, is possible based upon the decisions of the
Council.
D. The Court of First Instance's Diminution of the Caseload of the
Court ofJustice
How has the creation of the Court of First Instance contributed on the one hand to the improvement of the functioning of
the Court of Justice, and on the other hand, to a better judicial
protection of Union citizens? Suffice to note that at its creation,
even when its powers were reduced in comparison with its powers today, the Court of First Instance took jurisdiction over 151
cases from the 622 cases pending before the Court of Justice.
Today, the reduction of the caseload of the Court of Justice
tied to the functioning of the Court of First Instance has became
even more pronounced upon the expansion of the Court of First
Instance's jurisdiction. In effect, the Court of Justice can now
even better concentrate its activities on its more essential tasks,
which are to maintain the balance of power in the Community
and to guarantee a uniform interpretation of Community Law.
The effect that the creation of the Court of First Instance had
upon the efficiency of the work of Court of Justice has not been
diminished by the fact that it is possible for the decisions of the
Court of First Instance to be appealed to the Court of Justice.
This is for two reasons:
* first, because the right of appeal to the Court of Justice is
limited to: questions of law, procedural defects before
the Court of First Instance that in some ways harms the
interest of the plaintiff, as well as violations of Community
Law by the Court of First Instance;8 in reality, even
though the Court of Justice is called upon to rule upon
7. Council Regulation No. 40/94, art. 65, OJ. L 11/1, at 18 (1994).
8. STATUT DE LA CouR CE, art. 51. See Mario Costacurta v. Commission, Case C-75/
98, [1999] E.C.R.

-,

[1998) E.C.R. 11-271, 11-282,

32; Smanor SA and Others v. Commission, Case T-182/97,

27-28.
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such appellate cases, the Court ofJustice does not have to
delve into the type of long and intense analysis that a fact
finding procedure requires;
second, because the number of appeals from the Court of
First Instance has not surpassed twenty percent of its total
caseload (one must keep in mind that the Court ofJustice
has affirmed around eighty percent of the cases it hears
on appeal from the Court of First Instance).
II. VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE COURT OFFIRST INSTANCE'S
EFFORTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS
The Court of First Instances' contribution to the legal protection of rights of individuals deserves a closer analysis. One
contribution that is immediately obvious is, without a doubt, the
fact that the creation of the Court of First Instance has not created a special jurisdiction for separate and independent from
the Court of Justice. The Court of First Instance has been created because it was not deemed any more consistent with the
modern principles ofjustice to allow the Court ofJustice to exercise the functions for which it was originally created, as judges of
first and last instance. Its creation has allowed individuals to
benefit:
* on the one hand, two distinct levels of jurisdiction: of a
first level in front of the Court of First Instance competent to adjudicate the facts and to resolve legal questions;
and on a second level, in front of the Court of Justice
competent to review any possible mistakes of law that the
Court of First Instance may have made;
" on the other hand, a judge of the Court of First Instance,
who working in conjunction with the structure and the
mechanics of the Court ofJustice, is in a position to play a
dynamic, constructive role; and in fact, being aware that
its decisions are open to review, a judge easily will take
more innovative positions on the law, which can function
as a kind of "provocation" that is subject to later review by
the Court of Justice.
The operation of the Court of First Instance has been
framed around the idea that a single institution, the Court of
Justice, houses two separate bodies: the Court of Justice itself,
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and the Court of First Instance. The judicial system of the European Community more precisely has specified its function by
permitting the existence of suitable "shock absorbers" in order
to avoid conflicts ofjurisdiction. In this regard, one should here
mention the theory that the Court of Justice and the Court of
First Instance can be, at the same time, involved with the same
type of case-the former in a case brought by a Member State or
an Institution of the European Communities, and the latter in a
case brought by an individual. Henceforth, that which is foreseen by the Statutes of the Court of Justice and the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the Presidents of the two
bodies plan together in each actual case from the moment that
the recourse is brought in order to adopt a solution that best
serves the interests of a fair administration of justice.
The operation and the jurisprudence of the Court of First
Instance have had some developments that, even in light of the
limited percentage of appeals brought by and the weak percentage of reversals of these appeals by the Court of Justice, can be
recognized as characteristic of the jurisdictional system of the
European Community in its entirety. These developments include:
a) the methods of operation;
b) the protection of the rights of individuals; and
c) access to justice.
A. The Method of Operation of the Court of First Instance and the
Consolidation in the European Community Legal System of
the Member States' ProceduralTraditions
With the exception of Article 44 and the subsequent Articles
of the Statutes of the Court ofJustice, the method of operation is
fixed by the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance.
Article 52 of the latter establishes in its first paragraph that after
the written proceedings are complete, and prior to the oral proceedings in the case, the juge rapporteur-or the Reporting
Judge-presents a rapportprialable-orthe Preliminary Reportto the chambers assigned to the case. In practice, this Preliminary Report is accompanied by the report d'audience-or the Report of the Hearing-in which the juge rapporteurdescribes the
subject and the means of recourse, the conclusions of the parties
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and any intervening parties, along with the arguments advanced
by each of them.
The rapportprialable differs from the report d'audience in that
it contains a more thorough analysis of the legal context of the
case, the facts of the case, and the legal questions to be resolved.
The rapport d'audience contributes to the development of the
"contradiction." It reveals to the parties before the hearing the
manner in which they might express their observations during
the hearing, contingent on the manner in which the Court of
First Instance has characterized the positions of the parties from
the written proceedings. The rapport prialable, on the other
hand, is addressed solely to the judges of the chamber to whom
it is duly distributed sufficiently in advance to provide them with
adequate time to study it prior to discussing the case in conference.
All the judges of the chamber are in this manner expected
to engage in, during the conference, an active discussion of the
facts and the legal questions of the case, solicited by the observations of the juge raporteur. Despite the potential for conflict, the
conference occurs in an amicable, closed environment, with the
judges remaining non-partisan in relation to their respective nationalities. The judges are expected to have mastered the files of
the case. It follows that, in effect, the rapportprialable is largely
discussed in the chamber, and that for each judge, except for
the juge raporteur, they fulfill a sort of double role: each functions not only as a judge, but also as a sort of an Advocate General. In this way, the principle of collegiality is reinforced.
The merits of the operation of the Court of First Instance
are not limited to this situation; the fact that all the judges of the
chamber know the file in a thorough manner, thanks to the rapport prialable and the initial discussion thereof, adds a particular
vigor to the hearing. As a result, and as provided for in Article
58 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance, the
right to question agents, advisors, or lawyers of the parties is not
held solely by the juge raporteur,but is equally exercised by the
other judges in the chamber. Two types of consequences are
produced by this, one after the other in a domino effect.
1. The First Consequence
All of the members of the chamber are prepared to pose
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specific questions. They ask these questions in such a close succession that they often cause the lawyers to abandon some of
their arguments; but, even when the lawyers do not do it and
find their arguments rejected, the lawyers sometimes come to
see these decisions as irreversible. This method is one of the
reasons why only twenty percent of the decisions of the Court of
First Instance are appealed. This result is particularly important
for a judicial system like that of the European Community,
which does not have mechanisms in place for the enforcement
of its judgments, but must rely solely on the force of its own persuasion.
2. The Second Consequence
The commitment demanded of the judges by the rapport
prialableand the liveliness of the debate that takes place during
the hearing, have made it customary for the judges to deliberate
immediately after the hearing. There are no interruptions between the conclusion of this phase of litigation, which ends with
the oral proceedings, and the reaching of a judgment by the
chambers. The facts provided, either affirmed or denied by the
parties, along with the explanations provided by the series of
questions posed by the judges assure that the elements of the
case are clear in the memories of the judges. This phase of the
proceedings is very important within the context of the Community legal system, which does not allow a review of the facts upon
an appeal of the judgment to the Court of Justice, which is limited in its review only to questions of law. It follows then that a
principle grows stronger in the European Community legal system, which is neither in the Rules of Procedure of the Court of
First Instance nor in the Statutes of the Court of Justice, but is
recognized in several Member States as a constitutional principle: the principle of the "immediate decision."9
Based on the preceding observations, one could claim that
the method of operation of the Court of First Instance helps in
characterizing the European Community legal system in its entirety, in so much as the system is based on two levels ofjurisdic9. The usage established in this manner by the Court of First Instance of the European Communities is all the more important since the Court ofJustice of the European
Communities had just rightly affirmed that this principle is written neither in the EC
Treaty nor in the Statutes, see the judgment of the Court ofJustice from December 17,
1998, in Baustahlgewebe GmbH v. Commission, Case C-185/94 P, [1999] E.C.R. _,
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tion and attempts to combine the legal traditions of the Member
States, such as the principles of collegiality, contradictoire, and
"immediate decision."
B. The Difficulties Encountered in the Operation of the Court of First
Instance and the Efforts Being Made To Reduce Them
One cannot state, however, that the functioning of the
Court of First Instance is without fault. There is no doubt that
the principle flaw is in the duration of proceedings. Ajudgment
of the Court of Justice of December 17, 1998 dealt with an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance where the
complaint of the applicant to the Court of First Instance stated
that the Court of First Instance had violated Article 6 of the European Convention on the Safeguarding of Human Rights and
Fundamental Liberties (the Convention of Rome of November
4, 1950), which established the principle of a reasonable duration of a proceeding. In the reasoning of its opinion, the Court
of Justice highlighted that the proceeding in the Court of First
Instance, having resulted in the partial repeal of a decision of
the Commission, had lasted from October 20, 1989 to April 6,
1995, and that, in spite of the complexity of the case-eleven
cases had been joined-the length of the case still exceeded reasonable time limits. Therefore, the Court of Justice reduced the
fine to 50,000 ECU that had been imposed by the Commission
upon the applicant, and which the Court of First Instance had
already reduced to 3,000,000 ECU. This subsequent reduction
to 50,000 ECU by the Court of Justice was ordered in the name
of equitable compensation for the excessive length of the proceedings.1 0
I have said that sometimes the decisions of the Court of First
Instance can be very "provocative;" this case of the Court of Justice shows that this provocation can go both ways. While compensatory damages of 50,000 ECU is really nothing considering
that the original fine was 3,000,000 ECU; nevertheless, it remains
that the joining of the Court of First Instance to the Court of
Justice has produced a "spark" that has instigated the pursuit of
an improvement in the legal protection of individuals.
Even if one agrees with the Court of Justice that the proceedings before the Court of First Instance had surpassed a rea10. Id

26-48.
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sonable time limit,1 1 some of the difficulties encountered by the
Court of First Instance are worth noting. The determination of
the facts, which are normally very complex, requires detailed attention and thorough work. In addition, each document of the
file must be translated, but Translation Services has been overwhelmed because of a constant increase in the number of cases,
and the need for new employees has been met in a far from
satisfactory manner.
The effort to surmount all of these difficulties is nevertheless intense and growing. One means utilized is the application
of Article 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of First
Instance. It suffices to recall the contents of Article 111:
Where it is clear that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action or where the action is
manifestly inadmissible or manifestly lacking any foundation
in law, the Court of First Instance may, by reasoned order,
after hearing the Advocate-General and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action. 12
The results of the efforts accomplished so far are not negligible. The statistical data indicates to us that in 1998, the
number of cases that were decided surpassed the number of
cases that were brought, and that the total number of cases
pending is shrinking. The number of cases decided was 319,
compared to the 215 cases brought. The number of pending
cases was reduced from 1106 in 1997 to 1002 in 1998; this
number can be reduced to 500 if one takes into account that
several of the pending cases have been joined or have been suspended. In any case, the efforts must be intensified.
C. The ExpandingJurisdictionfrom the Creation of the
European Community Trademark
The European Community has created a number of specialized bodies, often called "offices," charged with particular missions. The Office of the Harmonization of the Internal Market
("OHIM") is among them and was created by Regulation No.
11. The Court of Justice noted that, between the closing of the written proceedings and the opening of the oral proceedings, 30 months had passed, and that, between
the closure of the oral proceedings and the pronouncement of the judgment, 22 additional months had passed.

12.

STATUT DE LA COUR

CE,

art. 111.
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40/94 of December 20, 1994. It is located in Alicante, Spain and
has as its mission to implement the European Community
Trademark, which the same Regulation had created.
By the end of October 1998, this office had received 93,000
registration applications. If an application for a trademark is rejected, then the applicant has the right to challenge this rejection, in certain instances, to the "Board of Appeals," whose members are independent. The aforementioned Regulation anticipates a right of appeal to the Court of First Instance from
decisions of this appellate office. Nine appeals have already
been introduced to the Court of First Instance. It is reasonable
to expect that in the future, around 800 appeals per year could
be brought before the Court of First Instance.
D. Some Examples of the Contributions that the Jurisprudenceof the
Court of First Instance Has Brought in Order To Improve the
Protection of the Rights of Individuals in the Area of
Competition Law
As it has already been remarked upon, the two other aspects
of the contribution of the Court of First Instance in the pursuit
of the goal of the creation of a European Citizenship are the
protection of individual rights and access to justice. The Court
of First Instance has made a notable effort to contribute to the
protection of individual rights through its jurisprudence in the
area of competition law, an area where the Court of First Instance hears its most important and most difficult cases. In the
greatest sense, this sector covers the prohibition of illegal agreements or abuse of a dominant position covered by Articles 81
and 8213 (previously Articles 85 and 86) of the EC Treaty, the
control of Member State aid to undertakings, the monitoring of
mergers, and commercial defense of the European Community
against dumping and subsidies from importation from nonMember State countries.
The problems in this area are very delicate. It is a matter of
assuring that the activities of individuals and Member State public administrations do not interfere with the Community public
interest and of guaranteeing in the common market a situation
of competition that puts competitors on equal footing with re13. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art 81-82, O.J. C 340/3, at 208-09 (1997),
37 I.L.M. at 93-94 (ex Article 85-86).
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spect to free movement of goods. To this end, European Community Law confers upon the Commission the mission to oversee that the market remains competitive, a mission that can be
accomplished thanks to their ability to investigate and to impose
fines.
Concerning the undertakings subject to the application of
Articles 81 and 82, these powers are governed by Regulations
17/621 and 99/63,15 which recognize an individual's ability to
contribute to the execution of the Commission's functions by
bringing a formal complaint or by furnishing observations during the administrative proceedings. The future of large undertakings and their employees may depend on the decisions issued
by the Commission.
Its function being "extensive and general," the Commission
has the power to "take all necessary measures in order to accomplish the mission with which it has been entrusted, including defining its priorities," according to the criteria such as that of "the
Community interest." The evaluation of the existence of the
Community interest implies that there is a discretionary power
on the part of the Commission that excludes, for the head of
administrative proceedings, the right to obtain 16
a decision with
regard to the existence of an alleged infraction.
Even if in such matters one must grant the Commission
such a discretionary power, and consequently deny the individual a right to obtain such a decision from the institution, the
Court of First Instance has stated that the Commission has, in all
cases, a series of obligations with respect to the applicants and
the other interested parties. It is fitting then to mention some of
the more interesting decisions of the Court of First Instance that
relate to this point.
In the case where the complaint can be dismissed through a
simple communication, the Court of First Instance has defined
that the right of the individual to obtain a stance implies a right
that they may also present their observations and, after this, a
14. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), o.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-62,

at 87.
15. Council Regulation No. 99/63, 127J.O. 2268 (1963), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 196364, at 47.
16. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance from September 18,
1992, in Automec srl v. Commission, Case T-24/90, [1992] E.C.R. 11-2223, 11-2241,
75-77.
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right to get a final decision, which could be later contested
before the Court of First Instance.1 7 This last right particularly is
guaranteed by the broad interpretation that the Court of First
Instance has given to Article 232 (formerly Article 175),18 as will
be expounded upon below. On the other hand, when the Commission receives a complaint and decides to investigate the complaint, it must act-except when the evidence provided is merely
circumstantial-with the required care, seriousness, and due diligence, in order to be able to consider clearly the elements of
fact and of the law brought to its evaluation.. 9
More specifically, concerning the protection of the rights of
individuals who have been harmed, the Court of First Instance
has developed punctually the findings of the Court of Justice.
These findings accord to the protection of the right of individuals and constitutes a fundamental principle of Community Law
that must be safeguarded even if the rules concerning the procedure do not take them into consideration.2 0 It affirmed that the
respect of these rights implies the ability for the addressee of an
investigation to have access to the file of the Commission, to find
out the evidence-both concrete and circumstantial-against
him, and to make useful observations in his defense on the conclusions reached by the Commission based upon this evidence.2 1
1. The Limitations Placed on the Commission in the Exercise
of Its Power To Impose Sanctions
Regarding the exercise of its power to impose sanctions, the
Court of First Instance has confirmed that it is desirable that undertakings-in order to be able to understand fully the action
against them-have detailed knowledge of the method by which
the Commission computed the sanctions imposed upon them
for violations of Community Competition Law, without their be17. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance from June 27, 1995, in
Gu~rin Automobiles v. Commission, Case T-186/84, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1753, 11-1769,
34.
18. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art 232, O.J. C 340/3, at 273 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 175).
19. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance fromJune 29, 1993, in
Asia Motor France v. Commission, Case T-7/92, [1993] E.C.R. 11-671, 11-684,
36.
20. This reflects the judgment of the Court of Justice from February 13, 1979, in
Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461.
21. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance from June 29, 1995, in
Solvay v. Commission, Case T-30/91, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1775, 11-1802,
59.
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ing obligated to place a formal complaint in a judicial proceeding to receive such information. 22 In this regard, the Court of
First Instance also has stated that, although the method of calculating fines is chosen by the Commission, it is necessary that the
concerned party, and if need be the Court of First Instance, is
able to check the methods used and the steps taken by the Commission in calculating these fines to ensure that they are free
from error and consistent with the spirit and principles applicable to fines.2 3
In another case concerning fines, the Court of First Instance recently has overturned a decision made by the Commission to fine a company where in calculating the penalty the
Commission deemed the concerned undertaking "recidivist" because of a previous infraction committed by a sister company.
The Court of First Instance affirmed that the notion of recidivism, as it is understood in a number of Member States' legal
systems, implies that a person has committed a new infraction
after previously having been penalized for similar infractions.
The Court of First Instance has in this way shown that it is necessary to consider the principle of individual responsibility, present in many Member States' legal systems, as being a part of
Community Law. It judged that the imposition of a fine on a
sister company during the infraction committed by the concerned undertaking is not sufficient to punish the latter as recid24
ivist.

In yet another case concerning fines, the Court of First Instance held on July 10, 1997 in the case of AssiDomin v. Commission2 5 on the effects of a ruling by the court in which it overturned a decision of the Commission that had imposed a fine on
22. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance from April 6, 1995, in
Tr~filunion v. Commission, Case T-148/89, [1995] E.C.R. 11-1063, 11-1119-20,
142.
23. This reflects thejudgment of the Court of First Instance from March 11, 1999,
Thyssen Stahl v. Commission, Case T-141/94, [1999] E.C.R......

609.

24. Id. 617.
25. The judgment of the Court of First Instance from July 10, 1997, AssiDomdn v.
Commission, Case T-227/95, [1997] E.C.R. 11-1185, 11-1213, 72. It is necessary to state
that this judgment was appealed to the Court ofJustice by the Commission (Case C-31097 P). In his conclusions of January 28, 1999, Advocate General D. Ruiz-Jarabo delivered his findings in favor of the appellant accepting the conclusions to this case in
supporting that the delay of two months, as foreseen in Article 173 of the EC Treaty,
place an importance upon the judicial security that cannot be distorted by a liberal
interpretation of Article 176 of the EC Treaty. In its judgment of September 14, 1999,
the Court of Justice accepted the suggestions of the Advocate General.
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certain undertakings that engaged in concerted practices. According to the Court of First Instance, in this case, the Commission may be required-under Article 233 (ex Article 176)26 of
the EC Treaty to consider-pursuant to a request made within a
reasonable period, whether it needs to take measures in relation
not only to the successful parties, but also to the addressees of
that act who did not bring an action for annulment. Where that
ruling could produce direct effects only for the parties who had
made recourse to the court, it would have been inconsistent with
the principle of legality for the Commission not to have a duty to
repeal its initial decision in relation to another party that did not
lodge an analogous recourse.
2. The Rights of Workers with Respect to the Evaluation of
State Aid; The Functional Character of the Criterion Used
To Evaluate an Actor in a Market Economy
The positions taken in the cases discussed above show how
the Court of First of Instance recognizes that even when dealing
within the delicate sphere of discretionary powers of Community
Institutions, there is a space reserved for the legal protection of
the rights of individuals. This protection that it assures to individuals is made in the public interest directed by European Community Competition Law. In this way, it is particularly interesting to note the positions that the Court of First Instance has
taken in the application of the articles of the EC Treaty and the
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
concerning state aids.
It was necessary to establish the criteria utilized in the legal
evaluation of the exercise of power that the aforementioned
Treaties have given to the Council and to the Commission in this
matter. This analysis was done in the framework of an appeal
from a Commission decision refusing authorization of certain
state aids. On the one hand, one has evoked the justification of
social necessity in maintaining that this decision would wrong
the right of work of employees of undertakings who would have
benefited from these aids; and on the other hand, one has maintained that the safeguarding of the salaries of the employment of
26. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art 233,

I.L.M. at 126 (ex Article 176).

O.J.

C 340/3, at 273 (1997), 37
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these undertakings would cause damage to the employees of
competing undertakings.
The Court of First Instance maintained the balance that the
Court of Justice has established between these two competing
demands when the Court of First Instance ruled that the intervention of a Member State or a Member State Public Authority,
whether in the form of a subsidy or a reduction of the expenses
normally born by such an undertaking, is compatible with Community Law. This intervention is justifiable on the basis of criteria that would be followed by a large scale undertaking (such as a
holding) acting with a long term plan in a market economy. In
response to the observation that the application of such criterion
is not adequate in all sectors, such as that of the iron and steel
industry that has a particular need for public subsidies, the
Court of First Instance stressed that the said criterion had been
confirmed by Community Legislation. It also stressed that the
criterion had stated specifically that, in the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community as well as in that of the European Community, it may be applied "in so far as it serves to detect advantages which damage or threaten to damage competition. ' 27 To the confirmation of the criterion established by the
Court ofJustice, the Court of First Instance added, in an implicit
but sufficiently clear manner, an important clarification: this criteria does not have an absolute character, but a functional one,
permitting it to operate as an instrument in the pursuit of one of
the objectives of the European Community.
III. TWO EXAMPLES FROM THE JURISPRUDENCEIN THE
AREA OF CUSTOMS LAW THE LEGAL PROTECTION
OF IMPORTERS AD THE CONCEPT OF
COMMERCIAL RISK
The case law of the Court of First Instance has attempted to
define further in a substantive manner the dimensions of the
protection of individual rights in the application of the principle
of proper administration, which is not only manifested in the
area of Competition Law, but may also be seen in other areas
related to it. It is enough here to show the manner in which it
has recently manifested itself in the field of customs law in the
27. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance from March 25, 1999,
in Forges de Clabecq v. Commission, Case T-37/97, [1999] E.C.R.
.,..
71.
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cases of Primex2 8 (better known as the "Hilton Beef" case) and
Opel Austria.2 9
In the Primex case, two German undertakings had imported
meat from Argentina in the framework of a quota, "the Hilton
quota." The importation of this meat under the quota was contingent upon the presentation of a certificate of authenticity that
had to be delivered by an Argentine authority. Although subject
to a tariff of twenty percent, they were exempt from this tariff
through these certificates, and the tariff would have amounted
to approximately DM10/kilogram. It was found that many of
the certificates upon which these importations had been exempted had been falsified. The German companies, after that
fact, were requested to pay customs duties according to the tariff
of twenty percent. After having paid, they solicited for remission
of the import duties, on the basis of Article 13 of Commission
Regulation No. 1430/79.
The German Ministry of Finance in turn asked the Commission to make a judgment on this matter. The decision of the
Commission having been unfavorable to the German undertakings, presented an appeal to the Court of First Instance. The
Commission has, among other things, maintained that the European Community has not supported the detrimental consequences of incorrect actions of importers. Furthermore, an economic operator, advised and aware of the state of regulations in
a particular market, must be able to evaluate the inherent risks
in the market in which he is prospecting and accept those risks
as normal commercial risks. The German undertakings, on
their part, complained to the Commission about the lack of
oversight in supervision of the imports under the Hilton quota,
failures that would have prevented such falsifications and the
losses that they sustained.
The problem presented is how to determine to what degree
the Commission had the responsibility to oversee the authenticity of the Argentine certificates and to what degree it was the
responsibility of the importers. The Commission claimed that
all vigilance should have been the responsibility of the importers, also claiming that the importers should also have born all of
28. Primex v. Commission, Case T-50/96.
29. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance ofJanuary 22, 1997, in
Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, Case T-115/94, [1997] E.C.R. 11-39.
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the consequences of the fact that the certificates were fake and
that they should therefore pay, after the fact, the tariffs duethis all being part of the "commercial risk" that the importers
undertook. The Court of First Instance did not agree.
Article 13 of Regulation No. 1430/79, invoked by the applicants, contains a general equity clause, intended to be applied
when the circumstances characterizing the relationship between
an economic operator and the administration are such that it is
not fair to impose on this operator a harm to which he would
not have normally been subjected. The Court of First Instance
held that when applying this standard the Commission should
consider the totality of the circumstances. If the Commission in
this regard uses its discretionary power, then it is bound to exercise such power balancing the interests of, on the one hand, the
interests of the European Community to insure the integrity of
its laws on importation, and on the other hand, the interests of
the importers who in good faith did not undertake any risk
greater than the normal commercial risk of such an enterprise. At
the time of its analysis of the request for a remission of the tariffs
due, the Commission did not consider the interests of the importers. The Commission should also, if need be, have considered its own role in the incident.3 0 In this case, the Court of
First Instance held that the actions of the Commission were
flawed in that their refusal to remit the tariff in question had
caused to the German companies a damage inequitable in the
use of Article 13 of the regulation mentioned above.
A. The Protection of Legitimate Expectations and the Conformity of
the Communities Actions to the International
Laws and Treaties
1 the Court of First Instance gave
In the case of Opel Austria,"
significant impetus to the development of the jurisprudence of
the Court of Justice in matters of protection of the legitimate
expectations that the Community Institutions may engender in
individuals. The case law of the Court of Justice in this area initially developed from the idea that the principle of protection of
legitimate expectations is an equitable principle applied by the

30. Primex, supra note 28, Case T-50/96, 116.
31. Opel Austria GmbH, [1997] E.C.R. 1143. For information on this case, see also,
MENGOZZI, supra note 3, at 201.
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courts using a "case by case balance of interest." According to
this approach, a legitimate expectation can be considered to exist and deserve protection only if two conditions are simultaneously met:
1) the creation, in the mind of the individual, of the expectation of the maintenance of a situation in his favor by
the decisions of Community Institutions, an expectation
that must be reasonable and which does not result from
improper behavior by the individual or by error of law
committed by the said Community Institution; and
2) the compatibility of the legal protection of said expectation with the general objectives pursued by the European Community.
In each concrete case, the Court of Justice would determine if
there was a legitimate expectation, and consequently, whether it
should be protected through balancing these two considerations, both being worthy of equal consideration.
Over time the Court of Justice abandoned this method and
switched to a "two-step analysis approach" and affirmed that the
analysis bearing on the existence of legitimate expectations and
that the analysis aimed at establishing a balance between the
protection of this legitimate expectation with the general public
interest were to be put into effect separately, the one after the
other-granting a superior judicial protection to an existing legitimate expectation. Following this new approach, the legitimate expectation is created, and therefore must be protected, as
long as the first condition is satisfied (a reasonable expectation
such as the one qualified in point 1 above). The derogation
from the protection of the legitimate expectations is still, however, possible in the pursuit of the general interest, but only in
certain extreme situations.3 2
The impetus that the Court of First Instance, through the
Opel Austria case, gave to changing the Court of Justice's approach to the application of the principle of legitimate expectations is significant. It is significant that the Court of First Instance brought forth from this new method of analysis important
32. This reflects the judgment of the Court of Justice of June 2, 1994, in De
Compte v. Parliament, Case C-326/91, [1994] E.C.R. 1-2091. On the changing of the
test that marks this case, see Paolo Mengozzi, Evolution de la mithode suivie parlajurisprudence communautaire en matiere de protection de la confiance lMgitime: de la mise en balance des
intirits, cas par cas, d l'analyse en deux phases, SINGLE EUR. MARKET R., 1997, 13 et seq.
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consequences with respect to the determination of the consequences of the incompatibility of a normative Community act
with an international treaty/law.
In effect, before the judgment in the Opel Austria case, European Community case law had affirmed in a theoretical way that
a Community act is not valid when it is incompatible with an
international treaty binding the European Community and containing some directly applicable provisions. This theoretical
conclusion, however, had never seen a practical application.
The problem of incompatibility of a Community act with international law notably presented itself in the cases concerning the
validity of certain Community acts against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 3 ("GATT") of 1947. In all of these
cases, the European Community judge refused to invalidate the
Community acts, based on the motive that the invoked terms of
the treaty that conflicted with the attacked Community acts did
not have direct application.
In the Opel Austria case, the applicant was seeking an invalidation of the Regulation of December 20, 1993,'3 which withdrew certain tariff concessions granted in the free trade agreement concluded between the European Communities and Austria. 35 This repeal could be justified on the basis of the Free
Trade Agreement, but not on the basis of the Treaty of the European Economic Area36 ("EEA Treaty") that the European Communities, the last party to enter into it, had approved on December 13, 1993. All the parties to the treaty (including the European Communities) received notification that the EEA Treaty
would take effect on January 1, 1994.
The applicant claimed, among other things, that by adoption of the litigated Regulation, the Council had violated the international public law principle of good faith. The applicant
challenged the fact that at the moment the Regulation was
adopted, December 20, 1993, the Council was already aware that
the EEA Treaty would have entered into force a few days later.
Since one of the major objectives of the Treaty was the abolition
33. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, A-23-25,
A-52-53, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 212-16, 250-51
34. Council Regulation No. 3697/93.
35. See Council Regulation No. 2836/72.
36. Treaty on the European Economic Area, [1991] E.C.R. 1-6079, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 245.
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of the rights to import tariffs between the contracting parties,
the European Community would have compromised the realization of this goal by adopting a conflicting Regulation after the
ratification of EEA Treaty.
Considering these facts, the Court of First Instance voided
the challenged Regulation. In order to do this, they observed
that the principle of good faith of international public law is the
corollary principle of the protection of legitimate expectations
that is part of Community Law. Applying the two step analysis
approach of the Court of Justice and by accomplishing the goal
of the protection of the rights of individuals, the Court of First
Instance stated that "the right to avail oneself of the principle of
legitimate expectations is open to each economic operator in
which the Community Institution has created reasonable expectations." Then, it clarified:
In a situation where the Communities have approved an international treaty and where the date entrance into force of
such treaty is known, the economic operators can avail themselves of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations in order to challenge the adoption, by the Community
Institutions, in the period proceeding the date of entrance
into force of that treaty, of any act inconsistent with directly
applicable provisions of it.
It is interesting to note that in this instance, the Court of
First Instance restricted itself to stating that a legitimate expectation had been created immediately by the Community Institution's adoption of the enabling statutes and the fact that the date
of entrance into force of the treaty was known. These legitimate
expectations we'e therefore justified to such a point that the
Court of First Instance did not even deem it necessary to proceed to the second phase of analysis, this phase being aimed at
the evaluation whether a general public interest could possibly
justify a derogation from the protection of the legitimate expectations. This stand confirms the "two step analysis approach," in
that the statement of the very existence of the legitimate expectations is absolutely autonomous with relation to the taking into
account of the compatibility of the legal protection with the general public interest of the European Community.
Besides, with regards to the relation between Community
acts and international law, one cannot help remark that the
Court of First Instance has arrived at its conclusion not by con-
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fining itself to commenting on the incompatibility of the Regulation with a rule of international law binding the European Community. It has done so by attaching a decisive importance to the
fact that this incompatibility violated the right granted to an economic actor from the working of the principle of legitimate expectations. If one wants, reviewing the jurisprudence with relation to the GATT Treaty of 1947, then the analysis continues to
be unchanged: the importance attached to the international
treaty in the invalidation of an incompatible normative Community act remains subordinate not only to the fact that the treaty
could bind the European Community, but also to the circumstance that its provisions have a direct effect with respect to applicants. The principle of respect of international law, while this
principle could previously appear as mere "lip service" given to
the European Communities desire not to appear as an island
unto itself, found itself with the judgment of the Court of First
Instance concretely embedded into the living body of European
Community law.
In addition, by having recourse to the principle of the protection of the legitimate expectation of economic operators, the
Court of First Instance enlarged the scope of the obligation of
the Community Institutions to consider international law with a
direct effect at the moment of exercising their normative powers. In fact, the aforementioned principle has permitted the
Court of First Instance to hold invalid normative Community
acts, in spite of the fact that the provisions of the EEA Treaty that
were invoked to invalidate the contested act, although capable of
a direct effect, were not yet entered into force at the time of the
adoption of the same act.
B. The Court of First Instance and the Access to Justice: The
Recognition of ProfessionalAssociations and the Right To
Challenge Community Acts or Failure To Act of
a Community Institution
Concerning the principle of the access to justice, the contribution of the Court of First Instance is particularly clear with
regard to:
a) the determination of persons, both natural and judicial
(local entities included), having to challenge acts of
Community Institutions in accordance with Article 230
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of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 173) ;37
b) the determination of cases in which it is possible to challenge the failure to act of a Community Institution in
accordance with Article 232 of the EC Treaty (formerly
Article 175).
Concerning the determination of persons who qualify under Article 230, the Court of First Instance has held that a professional
association having protected, in the framework of a hearing
before the Commission, the interests of certain of its members
and having demonstrated that these members are directly and
individually concerned by the decision made following this hearing, must be considered as individually concerned in the sense
of Article 230. It follows that an association having defended
only general interests is not able to bring such an action. 38 The
fact that they pursue general interests and the fact that they
claim to act for the just safeguarding of those interests does not
suffice, according to the Court of First Instance, to show that it is
directly and individually concerned by the act that they are challenging.3 9
C. The Recognition of Local Entities To Challenge the Safeguarding
of Its Prerogatives
The Court of First Instance later expanded the interpretation of Article 230 by granting standing to the Flemish Region in
its challenging of a Commission decision. This decision had
stated that an interest free loan of BFR20 million to the region
by the Kingdom of Belgium was contrary to Community law, and
had compelled the Kingdom of Belgium to apply a normal interest rate on the amount lent. The task of the Court of First Instance was not easy, because Community law holds the Member
States responsible for all aid granted by the public. The Court of
37. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art 230, O.J. C 340/3, at 272 (1997), 37
I.L.M. at 125 (ex Article 173).
38. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance of July 6, 1995, in
AITEC v. Commission, Case T-447/93, T-448/93, and T-449/93, [1995] ECR 11-1971.
In general, for information on the access to justice before Communityjudges in matters
of competition law, see Bo Vesterdorf, Complaints ConcerningInfringements of Competition
Law Within the Context of European Community Law, COMMON MARKET L.R., 1994, 77.

39. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance of October 4, 1996,
Sveriges Betodlares v. Commission, Case T-197/95, [1996] E.C.R. 11-1283.
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First Instance, however, accepted the standing of the action because in its opinion two conditions had been satisfied:
1) the Region in question was ajurisdictional person; 40 and
2) the challenged Decision affected directly and individually the Flemish Region by preventing it from exercising,
as it understood them, the powers that it inherently possessed and were not delegated by the Belgian State.4 '
The idea came from the recognition in the Community system
of local autonomous powers, which compare to those of Member
States. This recognition is limited to the protection of their prerogatives; it will be nevertheless interesting to note the reaction
to this decision in the Member States, and if need be, that of the
Court of Justice.
D. The Determination of Persons Individually Concerned and
Qualified To Challenge the Failure of a Community Institution
To Act in Matters of State Aid and in Matters of Special or
Exclusive Rights Granted to Undertakings
According to Article 232 of the EC Treaty, as interpreted by
the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice, a natural or
judicial person who would be directly and individually concerned by an act of a Community Institution may bring an action
for failure to act against such Community Institution. The Court
of First Instance recently has been called to take a position on
two of these failures to act regarding state aid and with reference
to the exercise of exclusive or special rights granted to public or
private enterprises.
1. Specific Rules of State Aid
The specific rules of state aid, established by Articles 87-89
(formerly Articles 92 to 94)42 of the EC Treaty, differ from those
40. It should be noted, in this regard, that Article 230 of the EC Treaty does not
limit itself like its corresponding Article did in the European Coal and Steel Community, to anticipating the possibility of a challenge only by businesses and associations,
but it refers to "any natural or legal person." For such an observation, see the most
recent judgment of the Court of First Instance ofJune 15, 1999, in Regione Autonoma
Friuli-Venezia Giulia v. Commission, Case T-288/97, [1999] E.C.R. _
41. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance of April 30, 1998, in
R6gion flamande v. Commission, Case T-214/95.
42. Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note 5, art 87-89, OJ. C 340/3, at 211-12 (1997),
37 I.L.M. at 96 (ex Article 92-94).
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governing cartels and abuse of a dominant position established
by Articles 81 and 82 of the same treaty, in its lack of acts such as
Regulations No. 17/62 and 99/63, which provide guarantees of
hearings to certain undertakings and undertakings associations.
The guarantees anticipated by these Regulations make it easy for
these people to be considered "individuals" among all of the possible persons that could have any sort of interest in an act
adopted by a Community Institution. Consequently, it is possible to recognize these same persons as individually concerned.
Such a situation did not occur with reference to the application
of Article 232 to state aid, being that it neither did not exist nor
were there any Community acts comparable to the cited Regulations.
The Court of First Instance, however, believed that the "individualization" of persons having the right to challenge the failure to act of a Community Institution is equally possible, since
paragraph 2 of Article 88 (formerly Article 93) of the EC Treaty
contains a procedural guarantee of a hearing in favor of certain
undertakings, which is comparable to guarantees foreseen by the
aforementioned Regulations. This guarantee springs from the
fact that the Commission must grant the interested individuals
the right to present their observations during this administrative
proceedings. The Court of First Instance added that the interested parties in this sense are persons, undertakings, or associations whose interests are possibly affected by the granting of aid,
which is to say probably the competing enterprises and the associated professional organizations. These same persons, the
Court of First Instance concluded, who exhibit certain qualities
that are particular to them or by reason of a factual situation that
distinguishes them in relation to similarly situated parties, must
be considered individually concerned in the case of such a failure to adopt an act. Consequently, they may bring a case for the
failure to act by a Community Institution before the Court of
First Instance.
In applying these ideas, the Court of First Instance recognized in a case concerning financial endowments given by the
Spanish state to some public television channels, that one of
three private, competing television channels was qualified to apply for a declaration under Article 232 (formerly Article 175) of
the EC Treaty that the Commission failed to fulfill its obligations
under the EC Treaty. It failed first, by failing to adopt a decision
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in relation to the complaints made by the applicant against the
Kingdom of Spain for breach of Article 87 of the EC Treaty. Secondly, it failed to initiate the procedure provided for under Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty, alternatively, for annulment under
Article 173 of the Treaty of the Commission's decision allegedly
contained in a letter of February 20, 1996." 3 The result is that
there is strengthened legal protection for economic operators in
the single market.
2. Lack of a "Guarantee of a Hearing"
A "procedural guarantee" comparable to that contained in
paragraph 2 of Article 88 of the EC Treaty is not contained in
Article 86 (formerly Article 90) of the same treaty, relating to
public undertakings and beneficiaries of exclusive or special
rights. The Court of First Instance in the case of Tlgvision franvaise 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission,44 has considered a competitor of
an undertaking that benefits from such rights as equally as individually concerned by a failure to act in the application of this
Article. The Court of First Instance observed that paragraph 3
of Article 86 of the EC Treaty
inserts itself among the rules whose object is to ensure the
free action of competition and that tends therefore to protect
the economic operators against measures through which a
Member State could place a check on the fundamental economic liberties guaranteed by the Treaty. It results, therefore, that an individual would know when a Member State
pronounces or maintains in that which concerns public enterprises or those enterprises benefiting from exclusive or special rights, measures producing an anti-competitive effect
equivalent to that produced by anti-competitive behavior of
all the other undertakings, would know that he was being deprived of the protection of his legitimate interests.
The Court of First Instance reinforced this conclusion in recalling that,
reviewing its jurisprudence, it has found a number of general
principles of European Community law which provide all persons with the ability to appeal acts which may have infringed
43. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 15,
1998, in Gestevisi6n Telecinco v. Commission, Case T-95/96.
44. This reflects the judgment of the Court of First Instance of June 3, 1999, in
T616vision fran~aise 1 SA (TF1) v. Commission, Case T-17/96,
50, 51.
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on rights that have been granted to them by the Treaty. The
great estimation of which the Commission places into the
body of Article 86 would be able to keep in check this protection.
The Court of First Instance in this way went from an "indi-

vidualization" of persons affected by the failure to act based
upon a by-the-book evaluation of written law45 to a less formal
position based on the application of a general principle of nonwritten law, a principle according to which the European Community law guarantees the most complete and effective juridical
protection of legal situations that it grants to individuals in a substantive manner. Thus the Court of First Instance produced a
further reinforcement of the legal protection of individuals.
IV. THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE RIGHT OF BUSINESS TO
ADVANCE THE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW AD
THE INCREASE OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE INCLUDING SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES
WITH RESPECT TO THE DETERMINATION OF FACTS
The broad interpretation thus made by the Court of First
Instance concerning the notion, alluded to in Article 230 of the
EC Treaty, of persons individually concerned, results in a consequence of remarkably practical importance. With the Single European Act, the desire to perfect the establishment of the internal market was asserted and the Commission extended to the
enforcement of state aid with the same rigorousness with which
it had always checked the behaviors of undertakings in the field
of competition law. This rigorousness is inevitably destined to
intensify. Given that the Court of First Instance will henceforth
be more frequently made to enforce the enforcer, it could be
called upon to verify the legality, not only of the decisions that
the Commission will make on these topics, but also the legality
of possible improprieties the Member States may resort to in the
public interest-for example by guaranteeing jobs to a certain
number of its citizens, although such actions may interfere with
fair trade in a single market. 46 On the one hand, the Commission has intensified the enforcement of the acts of Member State
45. Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 14; Consolidated EC Treaty, supra note
5, art 88, 2, O.J. C 340/3, at 211-12 (1997), 37 I.L.M. at 95 (ex Article 93).
46. See Tlgvision ftanfaise 1 SA (TF1), supra note 44.
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authorities with respect to state aids; on the other hand, undertakings bring complaints to the Commission so that they do not
allow their competitors to benefit from state aid, which alters the
fair playing field of the single market.
The perspective, it is certain that the Court of First Instance
always has adhered, is the spirit of the mission of the European
Community, which is to "promote the level of employment and
increase social protections." One, however, cannot forget that if
the Court of First Instance had been instituted to contribute to
the advancement of the legal protection of the citizens of the
European Union, then it was done for the benefit of all, not just
for some. The Court of First Instance is particularly obligated in
this area by virtue of the special prerogatives that are attributed
to it in the matter of determination of the facts.

